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YOU know something bad is going to happen in a horror film when someone decides to take a late-night stroll in a forest. The equivalent in finance is a bank boss insisting that his institution is completely solid.
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首段暗示当公司高层在大众面前宣称他们公司业绩增长非常好时,这正是该公司濒临倒闭的信号。 【notes】1.Equivalent 本意是等价物、相等物,此处主要是指 “bank boss insists that his institution is completely solid”与前一句话中“someone decides to take a late-night stroll in a forest”可以类比(analogy),都是悲剧发生的信号。
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European bankers have been saying things are fine for weeks now, even as their exposure to indebted euro-zone countries strangles their access to funding. The amount of money parked at the European Central Bank (ECB) has risen to 15-month highs as banks hold back from lending to each other. Fears of contagion from Europe have now infected America. Banks there led the S&P500 into official bear-market territory this week, as the index briefly dipped more than 20% below a high set in April. The chief executive of one embattled institution, Morgan Stanley, sent a memo to employees reassuring them that the bank's balance-sheet was dramatically stronger than it was in 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
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首句“欧洲的银行家们表示目前状况良好”正呼应了第一段所说,在金融界类似的情况就是当银行总裁信誓旦旦他的公司固若金汤,则是不好的情况即将来临。 |
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Europe is not the only problem facing Western banks, of course. A long list of woes also includes anaemic economic growth, piles of new regulation and waves of litigation related to America's housing bust. An ill-conceived congressional bill to punish China for manipulating its currency is yet another sign that America has little to be proud of in terms of economic policy. But the central reason to worry is the euro zone: a series of defaults there would unleash devastation, sparking big losses on European banks' government-bond holdings, and in turn threatening anyone exposed to those banks.
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承接上文提到的欧债危机,本段进一步探讨了a long list of woes一连串忧虑。 |
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Earlier this year, the prospect of another Lehman moment seemed remote. Thanks to the abject failure of Europe's leaders since then, the similarities with 2008 are disturbingly real. Governments are once again having to step in to support their banks. France and Belgium this week said that they would guarantee the debts of Dexia, a lender that was bailed out three years ago but which is weighed down by lots of peripheral euro-zone debt. In another throwback, plans are afoot to create a “bad bank” for Dexia's worst assets. The cost of buying insurance against bank defaults has surged: credit-default-swap spreads for Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs hit their highest levels since October 2008 this week. Rumors are rife:that banks cannot pledge collateral at central banks, that hedge funds are pulling their money from prime brokers.
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首句中提到的“Lehman moment” 与第二段末句呼应,指的是:2008年,美国第4大投资银行雷曼兄弟由于投资失利,在谈判收购失败后宣布申请破产保护,引发了全球金融海啸。“雷曼时刻”:类似于雷曼兄弟公司破产的历史事件再次重演。第二句,欧洲领导人不幸地决策失误,使得目前与2008年的情况出现了令人忧虑的相似,这正点出了文章的标题,“2008年的回音”。 4. 比利时德克夏银行:全球最大的城市银行。于1996年由卢森堡国际银行(成立于1856年)、法国公用银行(成立于1987年)及比利时信用合作银行(成立于1860年)合并而成。 >>参考纬基百科
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Name the year Will the fearfulness of 2011 turn into another panic like 2008? In any sensible world, it should not. Policymakers will surely not repeat the mistake they made then, of letting a big bank go under. The asset class at the heart of this phase of the financial crisis—sovereign debt—is far easier to value than the securitized subprime mortgages that caused the trouble last time. There is much greater clarity about where exposures to dodgy government bonds lie, although American banks need to become more transparent about their ties to Europe.
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作者在本段中,将现在的恐慌与2008年金融危机相比较,主要比较了两点:其一,造成现在的恐慌和2008年金融危机的核心资产,即导火索不同,现在的导火索“政府国债比起2008年的次级房贷来说,评估要容易的多。其二,比起2008年,现在承担国债风险的国家和投资者要清楚的多,更为人所知。印证了段首交待的结论:决策者不会重蹈复撤,像2008年那样的金融危机不太可能再发生。 |
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What's more, the components of a solution to the immediate euro-zone crisis, long proposed by this newspaper, are fairly well understood. First, create a firewall around other euro-zone members like Italy and Spain that are solvent but need help financing their debts; second, recapitalize the European banking system, which has done far less since 2008 to fortify its defenses than America's; and third, allow Greece, self-evidently insolvent, to default in an orderly fashion.
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本段列举了this newspaper即<The Economists>在解决欧债危机的问题上曾提出的三种方法,并且这些方法被决策者理解并采纳。 |
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The problem with this solution for the rest of the world is that it depends on the Europeans to carry it out. The debt crisis has been running for 18 months now, and the only way that euro-zone leaders have dazzled is through sheer incompetence. It continued this week, with some politicians admitting that a hard restructuring of Greek debt was on the table, whilst others ruled out a default. The result is the worst of all worlds: more uncertainty for banks that hold Greek debt, more pointless austerity for the battered Greek economy.
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“除欧洲外的其他经济体只能寄希望于欧元区把第六段中提到的方法来实践,这是目前最大的问题(因为欧元区领导人不称职“sheer incompetence”)。”本段开门见山,首句点出中心思想。之后举了“欧元区领导人在处理希腊债券危机时表现的不称职”这一例子,佐证了首句的观点。 |
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A clear plan for a forced bank recapitalization in the euro zone is badly needed, too. The mere rumors of it happening sparked a late market rally on October 4th. There are all sorts of reasons to deplore the fact that banks would once again be propped up by public money. It would have been far better if over the past three years more had been done to boost banks' capital and liquidity, and to create the mechanisms that would force bank losses onto creditors, not taxpayers. Every euro-zone finance minister should be forced to explain the whitewash “stress tests” that gave even Dexia a clean bill of health earlier this year. But for now the priority is to prevent a systemic meltdown, not to accelerate it for the sake of principle.
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本段揭示了决策者目前处理危机的几点不足。包括:亟需一份清晰的资产重组计划出台,存款人和纳税人的责任分开,解释年初“粉饰、掩盖”Dexia压力测试真实结果的原因。但正如末句所说:目前最重要的是防止整个银行系统崩溃,而不是追究原则问题令它加速恶化。 |
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A fragmented, nation-by-nation approach to recapitalization will not work this time, however. France and Belgium may be able to stand behind Dexia but supporting entire banking systems is beyond the capacity of many sovereigns. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the euro zone's bail-out fund, must carry out simultaneous injections of capital into the region's banks as soon as it can. Central banks must get into full fire-fighting mode, too. In particular, that means offers of unlimited two-year liquidity from the ECB, which was due to meet after The Economist went to press.
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虽然银行资产重组是解决危机的方法之一,但是如今通过分散的、单独国家来承担的方法达到重整银行资本的目的是行不通的。需要借助EFSF(欧洲金融稳定机构)的力量。 |
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Herding Eurocrats Above all, no amount of recapitalization would be enough to protect banks from a cascade of euro-zone defaults. Nothing matters more than putting a firewall around the likes of Italy and Spain. Here, the news is bleak. Jean-Claude Trichet, the outgoing president of the ECB, describes this as the worst crisis Europe has faced since the Second World War; but the institution he runs is unwilling to respond in kind. It is reluctant to keep buying government bonds itself, and is unimpressed by suggestions that it should boost the EFSF's firepower by lending to it. Politicians are contorting themselves to try to strengthen the EFSF without relying on the ECB.
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本段引用了欧洲中央银行行长谢里特的看法,再一次质疑了欧洲央行的决策。 |
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In 2008 governments were credible backstops for their banks and the Fed, the central bank at the heart of the crisis, was willing to do everything it could to create confidence. Now the sovereigns are the problem and the ECB's help is limited and conditional. That is the real horror film.
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文章最后再次将当前危机与2008年危机相比较,再次质疑了欧元区政府处理危机的态度和能力。而“That is the real horror film”呼应了首段,结构完整。 |
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